University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Faculty Journal Articles & Other Writings

Faculty Publications

1992

Court Defends, Slaps Injured Workers
Gregory S. Munro
University of Montana School of Law, greg.munro@umontana.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/faculty_barjournals
Part of the Workers' Compensation Law Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Munro, Gregory S., "Court Defends, Slaps Injured Workers" (1992). Faculty Journal Articles & Other
Writings. 45.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/faculty_barjournals/45

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at ScholarWorks at University of
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Journal Articles & Other Writings by an authorized
administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

Court Defends, Slaps lniurcd Worlç ls
By: Gregory S. Munro, Missoula
Two decisions of the Montana Supreme Court issued since
the last publication of Trial Tiends merit particular interest
for plaintiffs' trial lawyers; the first, as a measure of progress in obtaining adequate compensation for injured workers
and the second, as a stark reminder of the fragility of workers'
rights in the compensation system.
Francetich v. State Compensation Mutual Insurance Fund,
49 St. Rep. 0222, decided March lO, 1992.
This saluøry decision addresses in part the oppressive and

unfair application of Montana's Workers' Compensation
Subrogation Statute in situations where the injured worker
has not been made whole. The Court declared unconstitutional Section 39:ll4l4(6)(a), MCA, which granted the
insurer full subrogation rights even where the worker's
damages exceeded the combined workers' compensation
benefits and third party recovery. While Section 39:71414,
19,77 entitled workers' compensation insurers
the injured worker's recovery from a
against
to subrogation
third party, the subrogation right has been limited at times
by equitable principles adopted by the Montana Supreme
Court. In Skauge v. Mountain Snrcs Telephone and Telegraph,
lT2 Mont. 521, 565 P. 2d 628 (1977), the Court (in a case
not involving workers' compensation), recognized that the
insurer, who has collected premiums to cover a loss, should
not by subrogation be made whole to the detriment of the
injured insured. The Sknuge Court said:
". . . when the insured has sustained a loss in excess

MCA, has since

of the reimbursement by the insurer, the insured

is
entitled to be made whole for his entire loss in
of recovery including attorney's fees, beforeth:iriii
can assert its right of le-gal_subrogation against tË
insured or the tortfeasor!' Skauge, 565 P.2d at e¡äl
Recognition of the_principle that a workers' compensation
insurer should not be made. whole at the expen*" of än
inadequately compensated injured worker came in Hatt-i,'
Snte Compensation Insurance Fund,218 Mont. 18q fOt Ë.2ã
234 (1985) where the Court held that a work comp in*o.li
could not subrogate until the injured worker had been majå

whole.

But, the legislature in 1987 abandoned the equity and
fairness of Hall by amending Sec.39:'ll4l4 to add subsôction
(6)(a) which expressly allowed insurers to make themselves
whole at the expense of the under-compensated worker:
(6Xa) The insurer is entitled to full subrogation rights
under this section, even though the claimant is able to
demonstrate damages in excess of the workers' compensation benefits and the third-party recovery combined.
The insurer may subrogate against the entire settlement
or award of a third party claim brought by the claimant
or his personal representative, without regard to the
nature of the damages.
Once again, plaintiffs counsel experienced the frustration
of struggling against a third party for minimal compensation
for an injured worker only to have it taken from the worker
to reimburse a work comp insurance carrier which collected
premiums to cover the loss in {g_!r¡q g]ac¡:.lpqtcally, tþ9
(See SUPREME COURT, page 5)

Sen. Burns: Reform Prcduct Liability
Mr. Joe Bottomly
President

Montana Trial Lawyers Association
#l Last Chance Gulch
Helena, Montana 59601
Dear Joe:
Thank you for your letter regarding S. 640, the Product
Liability Fairness Act, introduced by Senator Bob Kasten.
I appreciate hearing from you.

I voted for the Kasten amendment primarily because Congress needs to act now to remove some of the barriers to
economic growth in this country. I believe Congress should
address new issues to get the economy growing again. One
of these issues is product liability reform.
The economy has rebounded some on its own, but the need
for Congress to take action has not diminished. In fact, the
need to reform our product liability system becomes more
urgent every day. The current system drives up costs in nearly
every sector of our economy, and does very little to improve

quality or increase safety.
This is a competitiveness issue and a jobs issue. Currently,
the typical American manufacturer faces product liability
costs that are 20 to 50 times higher than its foreign compet-

itors. This additional cost makes American companies

less

competitive; they lose market share to foreign competition,
so they raise prices and lay off workers which in the aggregaÏe
spells"recession. This is notjust a big business issue either'
Ii affects small businesses aõ much, ìf not more, than large
proones. The 1,100 percent rise in the number of federal
the
up
duct liabilitv casäs in the lØOs and 1980s has driven
cost

ofliability insurance. The burden ofthis

i, próportionatty much ;;;;

6;;"ll

a "make or break" issue for them.
The Kasten

u-"n¿-Jni;;JJi;;""

increased cost

business'

rt canbe

reformed the current

system to make it more effective. We must protect

pTpl,?l::l
Kasrç"

cãreless manufacturers and defective products-the
tt'o'
bill does not compromise that objective' It just insures
businessss
we do so in a fashion that still allows American

to compete and grow in the global economy' _
trtit itträ' ¡'rr gladtN
Although we seem ,"'ãrtàgi*

"î

took the time to uoi"" yourî8n;;r;;to;y once tte71.e^l"l,l,t.
lsù'-'
free to contact me again on this or any other imporÞnt

With best wishes,
Sincerely,

Conrad Burns
IJnited States Senator

t

uprcme court
from page 2)
section appeared to be in direct conflict with Article II,
16, of the Montana Constitution, as amended in1972,
provides in part:

No person shall be deprived of this full legal redress
for injury incurred in employment for which another
person may be liable except as to fellow employees and
his immediate employer who hired him if such immediate employer provides coverage under the Workmen's

Compensation Laws of this state.
In analyzing the conflict between the Constitution and the
statute, the Court in Francetich made two points
noting in the struggle to obtain legal redress for injured
persons in Montana. First, the majority confirmed that in
Wite v. State,2O3 Mont. 363, 661P.2d lZl2 (1983), ithad,
held that Article II, Section 16, created a fundamental right
of full legal redress for all injuries. Second, the Court cited
Corrigan v. Janney, Mont. , 626 P.zd 838 (1981), saying:
"this Court held that it is 'patently unconstitutional'
for the legislature to pass a statute which denies a certain class of Montana citizens their cause of action for
personal injury and wrongful death. We affirm and
refìne our holding tn Corrigan v. Janney, supra; we hold
that the Montana Constitution guarantees that all persons have a speedy remedy for every injury. The
language 'every injury' embraces all recognized compensable components of injury, including the right to
be compensated for physical pain and mental anguish
and tlie loss of enjoyment of living."
The Court concluded that Sec. 39:ll4l4(6)e) resrricts an
injured worker's right to..obtain a full legal redress against
third-party tortfeasors and'declared it unconstitutional. Plaintiffs counsel should note. however. fhat Fruncetit'h,like Hall,
involved a worker who had settled with a third party for policy
linlits. The case appears to turn once again on the fällacious
premise that it is only in cases where the worker has settled
for linlits that he can complain that he has not receivecl
adequate conrpensation. Perhaps in another case a victim's
advocate will advance the proposition that the beleaguered
plaintiff who settles for less than limits in the face of overwhelnring f'orces arrayed against him has often received
inadequate compensation, so that the insurer's subrogation
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could be inequitable even wherê the injured settled for less
than policy limits.
MTLA stalwart, Patricia Cotter, presented the amicus
curiae position on behalf of the MTLA in brief and oral
argument.
Burris v. Department of lttbor and Industm, 49 St. Rep.
326. Decided April 15, 1992.
This case is, in the words of Justice Trieweiler's ringing
dissent, a reflection of "a concerted effort by the Department
of Labor and the Division of Workers' Compensation to place

the burden of that Division's mismanagement on injured
workers-those members of society who are least able to bear
that burden." Burris, at 330.

ln Burris the majority

upheld the constitutionality of

Section 39:71-613, MCA, which allows the Department of
Labor to regulate attorney fees oflawyers representing parties

"a concerted effort by . . . the Division of
Workers'Compensation to place the burden
of . . . mismanagement on injured workers"
to workers' compensation claims. It is this statute under which

the Departnrent of Labor unblushingly limits attorney fees
that nray be spent representing injured workers while allowing the insurers to spend any amount they choose in defense
of the claims. The Court held that the practice of the Departnlent of Labor restricting the ability of attorneys for injured
workers to contract with those workers, while allowing the
insurers and corporations unfettered right to contract in any
way and for any amount the market will bear, does not deny
equal protection. Burris, at 3TI.
The Court rejected strict scrutiny and "middle tier" analysis and tested the statute by the least stringent "rational
relation to a legitimate government interest," characterized
by Justice Trieweiler in his dissent as the "almost anything
goes" test. Buruis, at 328. The Court, after quoting Meech
v. Hillhat,en West, Inc., 238 Mont. 21,716 P.2d 488 (1989).
for the twin government interests of assisting the worker "at
a reasonable cost to the employer" and returning the worker

to work as soon as possible, simply held "that Section
39:71-613. MCA, and the Department's application of the
statute to a claimant's attorney's fee is rationally related to
the government's legitimate interest in protecting the claimant's net benefits in workers' compensation cases." Burris,
at 328. Curiously, the Court ended by saying that application
of the statute was constitutional "regardless of any interpretation or implementation.by the Department of the words 'or
any party."' (referring to the irony that, while the language
of the statute allows regulation of attorney fees of "any party."
the Department only applies it to claimants' attorney fees).

In dissent, Justice Trieweiler, with the concurrence of
Justice Hunt, pronounced the application of the statute to be
a clear violation of the Equal Protection Clause of Article
II, Section 4, of the Montana Constitution. Justice Trieweiler

related a detailed history of the Department of Labor's
hypocritical attempts to interfere with injured workers' rights
to contract for legal services while claiming the interference
is intended for the good of the injured worker.
I
Gregory- Munro is a professor at the Universùr^ of Montana
School of knv and is Secretary/Tþeasurer of the Montanq Trial

Lawyers Association.
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